A Grand Illusion: America’s Anti-China Arctic Policy Is Rooted in Paranoia and Political Bias, Not Strategic Reality

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Drift ice camp in the middle of the Arctic Ocean as seen from the deck of the Chinese research icebreaker Xue Long. Photo: Timo Palo

The Arctic Institute China Series 2025

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America has long prided itself on being the guardian of the world’s rules-based order, and has until recently roundly criticized both Russia and China for working outside these rules (but now, with a rapprochement with Putin’s Russia in its early stages, the White House is lately focusing its scolding, primarily, upon China) – when it in fact appears that Washington has done all it can in recent years to blackball, marginalize, and isolate both Russia and China from the very world system it claimed to be defending.¹⁾Timofeev I (2025), “Russia and China in the Era of Trade Wars and Sanctions,” Russia International Affairs Council (RAIC), July 4, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/russia-and-china-in-the-era-of-trade-wars-and-sanctions/. Accessed on 1 September 2025; Bateman J (2022), “The Fevered Anti-China Attitude in Washington Is Going to Backfire,” Politico, December 15, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/15/china-tech-decoupling-sanctions-00071723. Accessed on 1 September 2025 The resulting alignment of interests and policies between Moscow and Beijing, and the intensifying perception of a menacing Russia-China axis that threatens the democratic West, are in large part a self-fulfilling prophecy induced by the very strategic myopia that China hawks – serving an electorate hostile to China’s rise (and its widely perceived threat to the American industrial economy) and intent on precipitating a new Cold War – have intentionally fostered.²⁾Bateman J (2022), “The Fevered Anti-China Attitude in Washington Is Going to Backfire,” Politico, December 15, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/12/15/china-tech-decoupling-sanctions-00071723. Accessed on 1 September 2025; Guzman C and Ewe K (2024), “Where Donald Trump and Kamala Harris Stand on China,” Time.com, September 11, https://time.com/7020042/trump-harris-china-explainer-trade-tariffs-taiwan-war-human-rights/. Accessed on 1 September 2025

The Red Arctic: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

America’s recent preoccupation with Russia, China, and their increasing alignment in the Arctic (reflected in Russia’s 2023 updated foreign policy concept as part of Moscow’s Eurasian pivot, driven by the West’s crippling sanctions, which essentially evicted Russia from the globalized world of economically integrated nations), greatly accelerated after Russia invaded Ukraine. Russia’s embrace of China was, consequently, a defensive move to offset critical economic ties that bound Russia to the West that were severed in the wake of its 2022 invasion, perceived in the West as an unjust and unprovoked war of aggression while in the East and much of the Global South as a just (or at least logical) war of sovereign restoration.

The Moscow-Beijing Arctic alignment has been in lockstep with the West’s economic and diplomatic isolation of Russia, and the increasingly militarized efforts by America and its partners to sever trade links tying Russia’s Arctic energy resources to European markets – dramatically illustrated by the September 2022 sabotage, by means of an undersea explosive attack, of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines majority-owned by Gazprom, at great risk to the marine ecosystems polluted by this presumably Western attack (blamed by some on the United States,³⁾Hersh S (2023), “How America Took Out The Nord Stream Pipeline,” Substack.com, February 8, 2023, https://seymourhersh.substack.com/p/how-america-took-out-the-nord-stream. Accessed on 1 September 2025 and by others on Ukraine,⁴⁾Entous A, Barnes J and Goldman A (2023), “Intelligence Suggests Pro-Ukrainian Group Sabotaged Pipelines, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times, March 7, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/07/us/politics/nord-stream-pipeline-sabotage-ukraine.html. Accessed on 1 September 2025 and curiously by yet others on Russia itself⁵⁾Ruiz R and Scheck J (2022), “In Nord Stream Mystery, Baltic Seabed Provides a Nearly Ideal Crime Scene,” New York Times, Decemer 26, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/26/world/europe/nordstream-pipeline-explosion-russia.html. Accessed on 1 September 2025 despite the illogic of such a view – part of a tightening noose to de-globalize Russia from the interconnected and interdependent world economy of the post-Cold War era.

This has forced Moscow to quickly pivot toward Eurasia to offset its sudden loss of access to Western markets, and to leverage its more protected northeastern Arctic shipping lanes, after having invested heavily in its shorter and more easily accessible year round sea lanes to the West, part of its robust energy integration with Europe after the Cold War central to German diplomatic and economic policy up until 2022. As the New York Times recently reported: “Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow’s new bond with Beijing has shifted the global balance of power. The rapidly expanding partnership is one of the most consequential, and opaque, relationships in modern geopolitics. Russia has survived years of Western financial sanctions following the invasion, proving wrong the many politicians and experts who predicted the collapse of the country’s economy. That survival is in no small part due to China.”⁶⁾Sonne P and Troianovski A (2025), “Secret Russian Intelligence Document Shows Deep Suspicion of China; Russia’s spy hunters are increasingly worried about China’s espionage, even as the two countries grow closer,” New York Times, June 7, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/07/world/europe/china-russia-spies-documents-putin-war.html. Accessed on 1 September 2025

Russia’s Resurgence and the Collapse of Circumpolar Unity

While circumpolar unity and collaboration has defined American Arctic policy since the Cold War ended, Russia’s military resurgence and increased military interventions in former Soviet territories have catalyzed an increasing wariness of Russia in the Arctic, evident in numerous American Arctic policy and strategy updates since 2016. Despite this new tilt in policy, the bones of American Arctic policy retain their collaborative spirit, albeit increasingly truncated as universal circumpolar cooperation yields to new strategic divisions between Russia and the West in the Arctic from 2022-24, before quickly pivoting to a new US-Russia rapprochement while anti-China sentiment remains ever strong since the 2024 election.

In its 2024 Arctic strategy update, DoD articulated its interests through an increasingly alliance-centric lens. As the Pentagon described:

The Arctic is a strategically important region for the United States. DoD’s foremost objective is to protect the security of the American people, including those that call the Arctic home. … Vital for homeland defense, the North American Arctic region hosts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning capabilities for the binational U.S.-Canada North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The North American Arctic region is also integral to the execution of IndoPacific operations, as the northern flank for projecting military force from the U.S. homeland to that region. … The Arctic serves as an avenue for power projection to Europe and is vital to the defense of Atlantic sea lines of communication between North America and Europe. The Arctic includes multiple strategically significant maritime chokepoints. Reduction in sea ice due to climate change means chokepoints such as the Bering Strait between Alaska and Russia and the Barents Sea north of Norway, are becoming more navigable and more economically and militarily significant.⁷⁾United States Department of Defense (2024) 2024 Arctic Strategy, 21, June, 2. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Accessed on 1 September 2025

China’s Arctic interests and its growing collaboration, driven by the West’s isolation of Russia since its 2022 Ukraine invasion, featured prominently in DoD’s perception of the Arctic strategic environment.⁸⁾For a more detailed discussion, see Zellen B (2024), The Pentagon’s New (Upside Down) Arctic Map, The Arctic Institute, 5 December, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/pentagons-new-upside-down-arctic-map/. Accessed on 1 January 2025 The aforementioned undersea attack on the Nord Stream pipelines, amidst western pressure on Germany to sever its energy ties to Russia, accelerated the decoupling of the West from Russia to quickly wean Western states off their dependency on Russian oil and gas exports (a hallmark of the East-West economic integration that cemented the post-Cold War peace), forcing Moscow to quickly pivot to Eurasia where it has found new markets for its energy resources, not just China but also two highly Westernized and predominantly democratic Asian states, Singapore and India, which take a more balanced approach to East-West divisions in world politics that better align with the historical experience and diplomatic values of the Global South, opening new opportunities for Russia as Western doors suddenly swing shut.

Moreover, even though Moscow and Beijing are now closely aligned, it would be shortsighted to presume this alignment will remain enduring given their past enmity and the potential for a future breakup. Indeed, according to the New York Times, newly acquired and independently authenticated intelligence documents from Russia reveal deep concerns in its FSB counterintelligence community with Moscow’s alignment with Beijing, and describe Russia’s efforts to counter the many emergent long-term threats China could pose against Russian interests, including future assertions by China of territorial claims intent on redressing unjust historical treaties that codified imperial Russia’s 19^th century expansion onto Chinese-controlled territories: “Mr. Putin and Xi Jinping, China’s leader, are doggedly pursuing what they call a partnership with ‘no limits’. But the top-secret FSB memo shows there are, in fact, limits. … In public, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia says his country’s growing friendship with China is unshakable — a strategic military and economic collaboration that has entered a golden era. But in the corridors of Lubyanka, the headquarters of Russia’s domestic security agency, known as the FSB, a secretive intelligence unit refers to the Chinese as ‘the enemy’.”⁹⁾Sonne P and Troianovski A (2025), “Secret Russian Intelligence Document Shows Deep Suspicion of China; Russia’s spy hunters are increasingly worried about China’s espionage, even as the two countries grow closer,” New York Times, June 7, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/07/world/europe/china-russia-spies-documents-putin-war.html. Accessed on 1 September 2025 Further, “China is searching for traces of ‘ancient Chinese peoples’ in the Russian Far East, possibly to influence local opinion that is favorable to Chinese claims,” the document says. In 2023, China published an official map that included historical Chinese names for cities and areas within Russia.”¹⁰⁾Sonne P and Troianovski A (2025), “Secret Russian Intelligence Document Shows Deep Suspicion of China; Russia’s spy hunters are increasingly worried about China’s espionage, even as the two countries grow closer,” New York Times, June 7, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/07/world/europe/china-russia-spies-documents-putin-war.html. Accessed on 1 September 2025 As the New York Times further describes: “Russia has long feared encroachment by China along their shared 2,615-mile border. And Chinese nationalists for years have taken issue with 19th-century treaties in which Russia annexed large portions of land, including modern-day Vladivostok. That issue is now of key concern, with Russia weakened by the war and economic sanctions and less able than ever to push back against Beijing.”¹¹⁾Sonne P and Troianovski A (2025), “Secret Russian Intelligence Document Shows Deep Suspicion of China; Russia’s spy hunters are increasingly worried about China’s espionage, even as the two countries grow closer,” New York Times, June 7, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/07/world/europe/china-russia-spies-documents-putin-war.html. Accessed on 1 September 2025

China’s Threat to the Arctic: An Illogical Strategic Misperception

Curiously, it is China and not Russia that tops the list when it comes to the DoD’s priorities and concerns as articulated in its 2024 Arctic strategy – a noteworthy but in many ways illogical strategic prioritization of what can be considered the least salient of Arctic security threats: “PRC and Russian activities in the Arctic — including their growing cooperation — the enlargement of NATO, and the increasing effects of climate change herald a new, more dynamic Arctic security environment. These changes, as well as the growing cooperation between Russia and the PRC, have the potential to alter the Arctic’s stability and threat picture. They also present opportunities for DoD to enhance security in the region by deepening cooperation with Allies and partners.”¹²⁾United States Department of Defense (2024), 2024 Arctic Strategy, 21 June, 3. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Accessed on 1 September 2025 As the updated strategy describes: “The PRC includes the Arctic in its long-term planning and seeks to increase its influence and activities in the region. Though not an Arctic nation, the PRC is attempting to leverage changing dynamics in the Arctic to pursue greater influence and access, take advantage of Arctic resources, and play a larger role in regional governance.¹³⁾United States Department of Defense (2024), 2024 Arctic Strategy, 21 June, 3. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Accessed on 1 September 2025

Not mentioned, yet no less relevant, is that China’s Arctic policy resembles in many ways in form and substance that of its neighbors, particularly Japan, as do its Arctic capabilities which more closely resemble Japan’s than Russia’s, with whom it is conflated by the Pentagon. Moreover, also left out is the importance of strategic context: China has risen fast and high as a global power, seeking “to pursue greater influence and access”¹⁴⁾United States Department of Defense (2024), 2024 Arctic Strategy, 21 June, 3. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Accessed on 1 September 2025 all around the world as all great powers do. Implicitly, this echoes the views of many a “China hawk” who parochially believe China should not be permitted to pursue its global interests like all great powers do – and has been accompanied by a parallel effort to marginalize Arctic indigenous peoples, muzzling their more logical arguments in favor of continued circumpolar unity and engagement across the re-emergent East-West fault line of world politics since the Ukraine War began. Indeed, China is not alone in asserting its Arctic interests and ambitions, not even close. Japan, Korea, Singapore, and India are also increasingly active non-Arctic states with expanding Arctic interests and ambitions, and these should not be perceived as threats to the Arctic or to the West, when in fact they are to the benefit of Arctic peoples, many of whom continue to live in poverty and face persistent gaps in health, nutrition, and economic security with their fellow countrymen to the south, and who welcome increasing interest in developing their homelands after long histories of neglect and exploitation.

The Pentagon’s Obsession with Beijing’s Arctic Ambitions

In its 2024 Arctic strategy, the Pentagon reveals its strategic obsession with China has clouded its judgment, not the first time American policy has been rooted in a grand illusion. This was evident during its tragic, two-decade-long Vietnam intervention, as it was again during its tragic, two-decade-long intervention in Afghanistan. Breaking with previous Arctic strategies, DoD’s 2024 strategy elevates non-Arctic China with not a hectare of Arctic territory under its flag to the top of its threat matrix, above even mighty Russia, the largest of the Arctic states with sovereign control over more than half the Arctic region.

In its strategy, DoD describes China’s Arctic presence, noting: “The PRC seeks to bolster its operational expertise in the Arctic, where its presence, while limited, is increasing. The PRC operates three icebreakers—the Xue Long, Xue Long 2, and Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di—which enable the PRC’s dual civil-military research efforts in the Arctic. Over the course of the PRC’s 13 Arctic research expeditions to date, the vessels have tested unmanned underwater vehicles and polar-capable fixed-wing aircraft, among other activities. People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels have also demonstrated the capability and intent to operate in and around the Arctic region through exercises alongside the Russian Navy over the past several years.”¹⁵⁾United States Department of Defense (2024), 2024 Arctic Strategy, 21 June, 3. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Accessed on 1 September 2025

Not mentioned, however, is that China’s increasing Arctic presence mirrors that of dozens of other non-Arctic states. China, like other non-Arctic states, holds observer status at the Arctic Council, with an Arctic presence that dates back to the interwar years of the early 20^th century, as evident in their status as signatories to the Spitsbergen Treaty that internationalized access to Svalbard’s economy, part of a global commons in the polar world that many nations, not just China, embrace. Moreover, DoD’s concern with China’s “dual civil-military” efforts in Arctic research mirrors that of the United States and all of its Arctic and non-Arctic partners, who until recently worked together to span old East-West divisions in the Arctic and for whom dual-use is a fact of life for Arctic research, where government funding and security policy priorities have a profound effect on Arctic research.

DoD’s alarm over China’s dual use is thus wholly unconvincing, as dual use is much more a norm than a subversion of norms in Arctic research, despite claims by DoD-funded scholars to the contrary.¹⁶⁾Northam J (2024) “Pentagon Sounds Alarm Over Russia-China Cooperation in the Arctic,” NPR’s All Things Considered, 2 August, https://www.npr.org/2024/08/02/nx-s1-5052089/pentagon-sounds-alarm-over-russia-china-cooperation-in-the-arctic. Accessed on 1 September 2025 As one official of the now-shuttered Wilson Center explained to NPR: “I think we see the PRC attempting to undermine regional governance and to increasingly advance this narrative that non-Arctic states should have influence in the region. So I think that is something where we do see the PRC influencing the governance conversation in a way that is contrary to U.S. interests … China sends its research ice breakers to the Arctic every year ostensibly to collect climate data. But, of course, they’re also collecting, you know, intelligence data and mapping submarine cables and all that kind of thing because, you know, everything they do is dual use.”¹⁷⁾Northam J (2024) “Pentagon Sounds Alarm Over Russia-China Cooperation in the Arctic,” NPR’s All Things Considered, 2 August, https://www.npr.org/2024/08/02/nx-s1-5052089/pentagon-sounds-alarm-over-russia-china-cooperation-in-the-arctic. Accessed on 1 September 2025 In contrast, dual use is very much normalized when it comes to domestic utilization of the Arctic, a troubling double standard. At Arctic Encounter 2025, “‘Dual-use’ infrastructure and technologies—that is, those that can be used for both civilian and military (or, perhaps simply multiple) purposes—was introduced several times as beneficial for both Arctic communities as well as national security presence, which is a different take than in some other recent conferences which have focused on potential threats posed if such instruments are in the hands of adverse actors.”¹⁸⁾Abbie Tingstad, “Arctic Encounter 2025: The importance of pragmatism in a post-exceptionism world,” Arctic Today, August 8, 2025, https://www.arctictoday.com/arctic-encounter-2025-the-importance-of-pragmatism-in-a-post-exceptionism-world/. Accessed on 1 September 2025

Indeed, much of the U.S. polar research community in the academic world depends on U.S. government and military support for icebreaker access, as well as other infrastructure and transportation support from the Thule Air Base in North Greenland to Antarctica. Just as the Pacific Ocean is not and never truly was an American lake despite the predominance of U.S. naval power in the post-World War II Pacific, the Arctic is not and has never been an American lake as Russia flanks more than half of the Arctic basin, far surpassing America’s or its allies’ Arctic littoral territories. Tiny Iceland in the High North Atlantic barely touches the Arctic, with only its northernmost island of Grimsey straddling the Arctic Circle, and Denmark is Arctic only through its colonial possession of Greenland. Sweden and Finland have no coastal access to the Arctic Ocean at all, which explains why, at that first, surprisingly divisive (within the West) Arctic Ocean Conference held in Ilulissat, Greenland, on May 27-29, 2008, these three Arctic states weren’t even invited, causing much diplomatic tension within the NATO aligned Arctic.

Normalizing China’s Arctic Interests: The Arctic as a Global Commons

Within this context, China’s Arctic interest and its limited, seasonal, and mobile presence, whether by ice breaker, submarine, aircraft, or visiting researchers seasonally resident on the Arctic territory of a sovereign host nation, seems at best a sideshow, and its placement as the top concern regarding the Arctic strategic environment as presented in the 2024 DoD’s Arctic strategy is at best illogical, and at worst a dangerous strategic distortion of reality. The 2024 DoD Arctic Strategy further elaborates its concern with China’s Arctic interest and presence: “Although the vast majority of the Arctic is under the jurisdiction of sovereign states, the PRC seeks to promote the Arctic region as a ‘global commons’ in order to shift Arctic governance in its favor. The PRC’s 2018 Arctic Policy claims non-Arctic states should contribute to the region’s ‘shared future for mankind’ due to the Arctic’s global significance. Its ‘Polar Silk Road’ has been used to gain a footing in the Arctic by pursuing investments in infrastructure and natural resources, including in the territory of NATO allies.”¹⁹⁾United States Department of Defense (2024), 2024 Arctic Strategy, 21 June, 3. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Jul/22/2003507411/-1/-1/0/DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY-2024.PDF. Accessed on 1 September 2025

This pejoratively mischaracterizes China’s view of the Arctic as part of the global commons, which is more fairly described by Trym Eiterjord in his 2023 article discussing China’s 14^th five-year plan at The Arctic Institute, who cautions that “[i]t is important not to overstate the significance of the Arctic’s inclusion in [China’s] current five-year plan,” adding that the “148-page-long document affords only a single sentence to the region.”²⁰⁾Eiterjord T (2023) “What the 14th Five-Year Plan says about China’s Arctic Interests.” The Arctic Institute, 23 November, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/14th-five-year-plan-chinas-arctic-interests/. Accessed on 1 September 2025 The Arctic “showing up in a section on maritime governance and marine economic development signals a geopolitical vision of the region centered around its high seas area and its marine resources, matching earlier observations that Beijing sees the Arctic largely in the context of ocean governance. Beijing has in recent years begun to articulate more clearly its own vision of the global commons, at least domestically.”²¹⁾Eiterjord T (2023) “What the 14th Five-Year Plan says about China’s Arctic Interests.” The Arctic Institute, 23 November, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/14th-five-year-plan-chinas-arctic-interests/. Accessed on 1 September 2025

The tendency by Western experts to overstate China’s influence and ambition in the Arctic is described in detail in a new report published by Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and Diplomacy, which finds “Chinese Arctic ambitions and activities are contentious,” and Western commentators “often frame Chinese investments in an adversarial way, describing Chinese activity in alarmist language in terms of scale, scope, and risk. Analysts have the tendency to mix proposed investments with actual investments.”²²⁾Edstrøm A, Hauksdóttir G, Lackenbauer W & Varvares T, “Cutting Through Narratives on Chinese Arctic Investments,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, June 23, 2025, https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/china-arctic-investments. Accessed on 1 September 2025 Indeed, the “scale and scope of actual Chinese investments are often exaggerated in media and public debate, and unsuccessful proposals are often taken into consideration when presenting the total amount of Chinese investment,” distorting reality in a manner it finds “striking.”²³⁾Edstrøm A, Hauksdóttir G, Lackenbauer W & Varvares T, “Cutting Through Narratives on Chinese Arctic Investments,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, June 23, 2025, https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/china-arctic-investments. Accessed on 1 September 2025

Indeed, while DoD unfairly and cynically casts Beijing’s vision of the Arctic as part of the global commons as a ploy “to shift Arctic governance in its favor,” the Arctic as global commons is in fact a widely held view shared by many northerners, Indigenous and non-Indigenous people alike, including visionary two-term Alaska governor Wally Hickel. In addition to serving twice as Alaska’s governor, Hickel – who served as Interior Secretary in President Nixon’s cabinet and famously saw not only the Alaska Pipeline built on his watch, but also welcomed the historic passage of the first comprehensive Arctic land claim accord with Indigenous peoples of the Arctic, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971 – promoted Alaska and the Arctic as not only part of the global commons, but the solution to what ecologist Garrett Hardin called the “tragedy of the commons,” as Hickel developed in his 2002 book, Crisis in the Commons: The Alaska Solution.²⁴⁾Hickel W (2022) Crisis in the Commons: The Alaska Solution. Oakland: ICS Press. Viewing the Arctic as a global commons is not a nefarious plot to undermine American hegemony, but the logical outcome of a generation of globalization linking East and West since the Cold War ended; America’s strategic anxiety over a thawing Arctic’s central position in the globalized world, and China’s embrace of this reveals weakness more than strength, trepidation more than confidence.

The West’s Long Legacy of Neglect for the Arctic

U.S. policy toward both Russia’s controversial claims that the Northern Sea Route is internal to Russia and Canada’s comparable claim that the Northwest Passage is internal to Canada, which rejects both nations’ claims, counterargues that these waterways are in fact part of the world ocean and thus part of the global commons. It is thus hypocritical of Washington to criticize China for advocating a similar view. Indeed, if America and its allies sufficiently invested in their own Arctic territories, built sufficient Arctic infrastructure, and developed remote Arctic economies to lift Arctic peoples out of endemic and persistent poverty, they would be in a better position to defend such a view. But China’s pragmatic realization that there is mutual opportunity for investing in the Arctic that can benefit Arctic peoples long neglected by their sovereign states is only possible because of such neglect and long periods of Arctic disinterest in the United States and other Arctic states for their far northern peripheries. If the Arctic less resembled the third world, having earned its own and even less developed designation as the “fourth world,” and more resembled the first or even the second worlds, such a position would have more legitimacy.

Indeed, there would be few inroads for China’s Polar Silk Road had America and its allies shown true and sustained interest in their respective Arctics – and had climate change not opened up so much of the Arctic to external access, it is likely that the region’s relative neglect would have continued. Even when there is evidence of a commitment to the Arctic and its development in the West, as seen in periods of resource booms from the Klondike gold rush to the North Slope oil rush to Nunavut’s uranium rush to Greenland’s rare earth metals rush, such interest is usually ephemeral, and marked by clashes of interest between indigenous peoples, non-indigenous settlers, external commercial interests, and governments, part of an ongoing dialectical interaction that endeavors to align disparate interests but often results in economic stagnation and protracted underdevelopment, as seen with repeated failures despite intensive reconciliation efforts to build a pipeline connecting Canadian Arctic petroleum resources to southern markets.

Let’s Welcome – Not Hinder – China’s Historic Rise

If anything, China is rising to the challenge of Arctic development made possible by failures in the West to fully develop its own remote Arctic territories. China should therefore be welcomed as an economic partner that reflects China’s global stature and upon which so many Western nations depend, and not as a spoiler intent on disrupting the Arctic status quo or tilting regional governance in its favor. Indeed, China’s participation in Arctic economic activities, and engagement with regional governance structures as it does elsewhere in the world, is part and parcel of being a global power. It is time to put such anti-China prejudices aside.

Just as it is illogical to see China sit atop DoD’s list of concerns with the Arctic strategic environment, it is illogical to see Russia, the largest Arctic state by far, come second after China on DoD’s strategic map of the Arctic, when China is a non-Arctic state. Indeed, it is profoundly worrisome that America, universally considered the world’s greatest military power – fresh from its 2021 strategic defeat in Afghanistan against the materially inferior Taliban, over two decades after it invaded Iraq on faulty intelligence of a non-existent WMD threat, and 70 years after it stumbled into its disastrous Vietnam intervention – still can’t get its priorities right or assess the strategic environment objectively in a manner that correlates with reality. With such a long string of military defeats to weaker adversaries from Vietnam to Afghanistan behind it, and a proxy war in Ukraine with Russia that has failed to keep Ukraine whole and yet risks escalation to general war, it is disconcerting to find DoD’s 2024 Arctic policy so badly inverted, and so dangerously decoupled from strategic reality.

Barry Scott Zellen, PhD, is a Research Scholar in the Department of Geography at the University of Connecticut (UConn), a Senior Fellow (Arctic Security) at the Institute of the North, and author of numerous books on Arctic geopolitics, including most recently Arctic Exceptionalism: Cooperation in a Contested World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Books, 2024).